Introduction
The work reported here is the result of a study done within a larger project on the "Semantics of Natural Languages" viewed from the field of Artificial Intelligence and Computational Linguistics. In this project, we have chosen a corpus of insurance claim reports.
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These texts deal with a relatively circumscribed domain, that of road traffic, thereby limiting the extra-linguistic knowledge necessary to understand them. Moreover, these texts present a number of very specific characteristics, insofar as they are written in a quasi-institutional setting which imposes many constraints on their production.
We first determine what these constraints are in order to then show how they provide the writer with the means to create as succint a text as possible, and in a symmetric way, how they provide the reader with the means to interpret the text and to distinguish between its factual and argumentative aspects.
Characteristics of the texts
This type of texts is culturally well-defined and possesses several characteristics, which both the writer and the reader are perfectly aware of when writing or reading one of them. It is not a newspaper story, nor a letter to a friend narrating the car accident, but an insurance claim report which has to follow several constraints, defined in (1).
(1) Text Parameters A. the text involves at least two participants, generally two vehicles, one of which is the author's;
B. the text is obligatorily short, at most one paragraph;
C. by definition, the text is a narration in which an accident takes place;
D. the text is sent to the author's insurance company.
Beyond these four parameters which are determined by the nature of the reports, we also find in this text presuppositions due to the particular domain involved, the "road" domain. This domain-specific knowledge, which is part of the more general context C , is called here K . K concerns vehicles, vehicle motions, traffic rules, the usual behavior of drivers and pedestrians, and also some elements of "naive" geometry.
Parameter D has a special bearing in so far as the writers know that the insurance agents must pass a judgement on their behavior and will determine their share of responsibility in the accident. Necessarily, the authors of those reports, while supposedly describing in an impartial way the different events which have occurred, will attempt to lessen their responsability. The texts thus present many instances of argumentative devices, whose usage forms part of the more general knowledge of the language conventions, LC . In a symmetric way, the reader, i.e. the insurance agent, must untangle the factual description from the argumentative presentation of the events.
We can define the tasks that this type of texts presents for the writer and for the reader as in (2) and (3) respectively.
(2) The Writer's Problem: The writer W knows the factual content P corresponding to the circumstances of the accident and wants to convey it through a text T . W must then choose a T such that (a) it will allow a reader R to rediscover P, and (b) it will minimize W 's responsibility.
(3) The Reader's Problem: The reader R knows the language conventions LC and a part of the context C . R must then determine (a) the factual content P of the text T and (b) the argumentation presented by its writer W .
These two symmetrical tasks are thus both composed of a factual and an argumentative part. These two parts also coincide with the two goals we can define for an NLP approach to understanding and processing these texts. At the first level, we try to extract from the text the objective content corresponding to a factual analysis in order to recreate the event: "What happened? What real world events concerning the motions of these vehicles or the scene geometry actually occurred?"
At the second level, we take into account the nature and intent of the text. Our problem is then to uncover the argumentative devices used by the writer and to determine how they can be used by the reader, and later by our system, in interpreting the texts.
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is divided into two parts. In section 3, we show the importance of the situational and cultural presuppositions for parameters A, B and C, and in section 4, we take into account parameter D, which determines the argumentative aspect of the texts.
3 Factual content of the texts 3.1 Parameter A Parameter A (the fact that car accidents usually involve two participants, most often two vehicles) is used to infer the identity of some entities in the texts, or to establish coreference between two entities.
There is a specific naming convention in French insurance claim reports for the vehicles involved in an accident: claimants must refer to their own vehicle as "A" and to their opponent's as "B". This convention, although it is part of the shared knowledge about LC , is not always followed, and indeed it seems to be a burden for W . The reason is probably that a stereotypical description using only labels "A" and "B" for the vehicles involved sounds very neutral, such as could have been made by any independant observer of the accident, while in fact W was directly involved in the accident, and is thus personnally implicated, as a person endowed with awareness and intentionality. Thus, the authors often do not seem to be able to choose between a narrative style using the first person ("I") and a descriptive style using the third person ("vehicle A"). Most of the texts are not homogeneous in this respect and combine the two styles, as if there was a struggle, probably unconscious, between a spontaneous narration of the different events and a stereotyped description using the convention. This hesitation which we observe in our texts is reinforced by the use of metonymy. Metonymy is often used to allow the identification of the container with its content, and a common use of metonymy in our texts concerns the vehicle and its driver. Metonymy builds a unique discourse entity, and as a consequence some properties from the vehicle are transferred to the driver, and vice-versa. Personalization of the vehicles is a typical example of this transfer: a vehicle becomes endowed with the properties of a human being, for instance by transferring from the driver to the car the property of intentionality as in (5 a.), or that of agentivity as in (5 b.) . (5) 
We can see from the example in (6 a.) that this unique entity does not consist only of the vehicle and its driver, but can also include its passengers. In (6 b.), there is an identification between the vehicle and the writer's husband, the writer probably being the insured person. Conversely, transference of properties can be made from the car to the driver, as in (7 a.) or (7 b.) . In (7 a.), objects (here the bumper) belonging to the vehicle are treated as belonging to the driver. In (7 b.), the property of "rolling along" (the literal meaning of the verb rouler ) is transferred to the driver. This use of metonymy follows the coercion of semantic types (see [8] ) in a predictable way: the properties being used to make an entity of one type (e.g. car : "inanimate mechanical object") into an entity of another type (e.g. driver : "human agent") are extractible in a regular way from the predicate (e.g. squeeze: "requires an agentive subject").
This coercion, economical for W because it allows a greater conciseness, requires additional work on the part of R, because R must make some inferences to undo it and to find the referent of some expression. For instance, a number of inferences, some of them spatial, are necessary to find the identity of the agent, i.e. the passenger in the right front seat, in (6 a.).
Finding the exact referent of an expression is necessary in order to block wrong inferences. For instance, in (5 b.), the 1st person refers successively to the car and to the driver:
• in I had switched on my blinker , the referent of I is the driver;
• being stopped can be understood with I referring to the driver as well as to the vehicle;
• in the last sentence, the word me must refer to the vehicle: from this text, R would never conclude that the driver's left cheek had been bruised.
Parameter B
When setting to the task of writing such a report, the writer knows parameter B, the constraint that only about a paragraph may be used to relate the accident. 2 At the same time, W must not forget any important information whose absence would prevent R from discovering the correct content P.
So, W is thus faced with two goals: to be exhaustive and to be concise.
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These aims are not contradictory but force W to select the information that will be given: the text T must provide all the information that is necessary in order to be understood, but only that much. We rediscover here Grice's Maxims [5] , in particular the Maxim of Quantity, or Ducrot's exhaustivity law [2] . Every detail mentioned by W can be assumed to be significant and every adjective and adverb will carry some significance for the narration, as in (8), where extremely relevant modifiers are piled up after the head noun.
(8) the road on which the intense traffic is going one-way in two lanes; (T5)
This constraint on the choice of information to give, which we call "W 's selection problem" and which we will later exploit to infer some argumentative points, is part of the wider language conventions LC and constitutes a "meta-knowledge", essential for the success of communication.
Because of "W 's selection problem", W will generally mention an event or an entity only in case its presence cannot be deduced from K or from other types of shared background knowledge, and only in case an explicit reference is absolutely necessary to understand the text. From this, it follows that the number of entities introduced in the text will be kept to a minimum. We can schematize this "Minimality Assumption" as follows: The text in (10) mentions only two vehicles. The first one, W 's, is implicit in I was driving. The other one is mentioned in two different expressions, a vehicle arriving in front of me in the curve and the car which was coming with great speed . It is clear that the second expression is anaphoric to the first, but this coreference is not explicit in the text.
The coreference is allowed first by the use of two compatible terms: indeed a car is a particular type of vehicle. This fact can be extracted from a hierarchy of concepts which is part of the background knowledge K (a car is the most typical kind of vehicle). Secondly, this coreference is licensed by the use of the definite article, which allows the inference that the entity has already been mentioned. Finally, it is confirmed by the "Minimality Assumption", which prevents the introduction of a third vehicle which would not play any role in the scene. 
Parameter C
In many of our texts, the accident is explicitly mentioned with verbs such as percuter, endommager, toucher, heurter ("collide", "damage", "touch", "hit"), or with nouns such as choc, collision ("impact", "collision"). But this is not the case in (11), a text for which, if it was another type of narrative, we might imagine other endings to the incident (e.g. but I was able to swerve and avoid it).
(11) We were in Saint-Ouen, I was surprised by the person who braked in front of me, not being able to change lanes, and the road being wet, I couldn't stop completely in time (T15)
We can see here the effect of Parameter C: since these texts are accident reports, the series of events they relate must by default contain an accident. The interpretation of the texts often requires the reconstruction of an impact between the two vehicles, otherwise the incident which is described would not warrant the existence of the report.
The existence of the impact can then be deduced from a combination of several clues, some linguistic, some inferential. Among the former, we often find the combination of the negation with a verbal group of the form "can/be able to + V", for instance I couldn't stop completely in time in (11), or I wasn't able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed in (10).
Argumentation
So far, we have examined the texts from a purely factual point of view. Now, we take into account the argumentative aspect of these texts. Indeed, the authors know that these few lines, meant for their insurance company, may contribute to the final decision about their share of legal and financial liability. So, they will try to minimize their own responsibility. There are two ways W can justify his own behavior and make excuses for it:
A. trying to push the blame onto his opponent by accusing him of an abnormal behavior;
B. contrasting what was expected and what happened in reality, by invoking unforeseable circumstances.
With either strategy, W must first show that he has done everything that was required in the given circumstances and will always try to appear as innocent as possible.
Strategy A: Blaming the other driver
With strategy A, W wants to suggest or to say explicitly that the other driver is at fault. Background knowledge K may be used implicitly by W to suggest that his opponent has misbehaved, and it also allows R to infer which behaviour is "right" and which one is "wrong". For instance, in (12), it is clear, but not explicitly mentioned, that the driver of vehicle B did something illegal, since in France one must pass on the left. These two examples show the importance of implicit knowledge, but blaming the opponent can also be done explicitly. Besides the example in (14 a.), where the truck driver is clearly said to be responsible for the manoeuver, there are lexical clues, such as slalom in (14 b.) (the driver of (12) is committing fault after fault!), or blinding in (14 c.), suggesting that the other driver was at fault. In example (14 d.), even without the background knowledge of the French right-of-way rules, the words denies and right-of-way strongly accuse the other driver. Driving at an excessive speed is of course a very common characteristic of the other driver..., see (14 c.) and (14 e.). 
. According to the witness who was following me, the driver of vehicle B was doing a slalom between the cars. (T11) c. A vehicle with full white headlights blinding us struck us with great speed in the back of the vehicle, taking us into a series of barrel rolls before the vehicle stopped in a ditch. (T10) d. Vehicle B coming from my left, I find myself at the intersection, at moderate speed, about 40 km/h, when vehicle B hits my vehicle, and denies me the right-of-way from the right. (T4) e. at that moment vehicle B passed me with great speed (T9)

Strategy B: Blaming unforeseable circumstances
Here, the indications are mostly at the lexical level (e.g.être surpris "to be surprised") and make frequent use of the negation. 
Another device is the reverse of the metonymy conflating the vehicle and its driver which we saw in 3.1. For instance, in (17), it is not W , but the car which is the subject of the two verbs, as if it was responsible for the events.
(17) on impact, and because of the slippery pavement, my vehicle skids, and hits the metal railing around a tree, whence a second front impact. (T4)
Of course the two strategies are not mutually exclusive; (11) and (18) are actually instances of a mixture of both, in particular (18) where W piles up all sorts of attenuating circumstances and also emphasizes (immediately put the brakes on) his own appropriate reactions.
(18) I was driving at about 45 km/h in a small one-way street where cars were parked on both sides. Popping suddenly on my right coming out of a private building garage, Mrs.Glorieux's vehicle was at a very short distance from my vehicle; passage being impossible: surprised, I immediately put the brakes on but the impact was unavoidable. (T14)
Morover, the authors may choose to describe only that part of reality which is in their favor, and the reader must thus be able to reconstruct the items that were left out (intentionally or not).
With strategy B, linguistic clues include the use of reflexive verbs (la porte s'est ouverte "the door opened") and of the passive voice (j'aiété déporté "I was thrown off course") instead of a plain active voice. These constructions, by suppressing the agent, suggest that W was not involved in the course of events and cannot be held responsible for what happened. We also find here all the adverbials and modifiers denoting unexpected events or unusual states of affairs. In addition to (18), some more examples are given in (19). 
Resolving Ambiguity and Drawing Inferences
These texts provide a number of examples of clearcut ambiguity between two situations A and B, which an argumentative type of justification helps resolve. The question that allows resolving the ambiguity is: "What advantage would there be for W in implying situation A? or in implying situation B?". We go in more details into some examples.
Lexical Ambiguity
As shown in (20), the original French text of the example given in (10) presents a common kind of ambiguity, since in French, the word droite is ambiguous between the two interpretations right and straight. 5 (20) Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chaussée (T8)
I was driving on the (right-hand side)/(straight portion) of the road
Here, even though the whole text can also be interpreted with the droite/straight meaning, the droite/right interpretation is more plausible. However, only an argumentative type of reasoning can lead R to prefer the latter.
Since the fact that in France one drives on the right is well-known, in specifying that he was driving on the right side of the road, W violates the Maxim of Quantity (i.e. not to say anything superfluous) and therefore must be taken as intending to convey some other information. In this case, it must be in order to assert that his behavior was conforming to the "Rules of the Road", which is a pertinent fact to mention. Here, informational redundancy by itself carries some information which allows inference.
We can thus formulate the following rule:
(21) In case of ambiguity, prefer the interpretation which allows R to infer a "correct behavior" on W 's part.
Time Reference Ambiguity
In example (5 b.), repeated here as (22) for convenience, the use of the pluperfect had switched on is ambiguous. The pluperfect implies that the process being talked about is perceived with another past event as a point of reference, which may not yet have been mentioned (the situation is exactly parallel in both French and English). Here, two different referential situations can be envisaged, with two different consequences:
• If the accident itself is chosen as the point of reference, switching the blinker on signals a future change of lanes. It must therefore be the left blinker. This conclusion requires geometrical reasoning: "If X is stopped in the right lane and if X wants to change lanes, X can only go left".
• If the time of stopping is chosen as the point of reference, switching the blinker on is prior to the time of stopping and thus signals it. It must then be the right blinker, since the vehicle is in the right lane.
To make a decision, arguments of the "Maxims" type must be used. R cannot assume that too much information is present in the text. The fact that the blinker would be switched on before stopping would not be relevant since the accident occurred after the act of stopping, when W started again. On the other hand, the fact that W did switch the blinker on before starting again is very relevant from an argumentative point of view, since the message conveyed is then "W behaved in the right way and did what was required".
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Therefore, by appealing to the rule proposed in (21), the first interpretation is chosen and R may conclude that W had his left blinker on.
Action or Intention?
Sometimes, the problem for R is to determine whether an action presented as an intended future event has remained at a purely intentional level or whether actions have been taken to attain it. For instance, when the intended action belongs to a script with sequential steps, the question arises whether some of the preparatory actions belonging to the script have already been accomplished.
In (22), we saw that there were two possible choices for a point of reference in the interpretation of the pluperfect. In addition, the verb s'apprêterà can have several interpretations. Like to get ready (which we give here as its translation), it can mean to be about to and then it is a simple aspectual auxiliary focussing on the beginning of the action (inchoative). It can also have a more agentive interpretation and then it means to actively prepare for .
In the inchoative to be about to interpretation, the action of "switching the blinker on" is an event independent of "changing lanes"; in the agentive to prepare for interpretation, that same action corresponds to one of the preparatory acts. But more crucially, in the agentive interpretation, W may already have started changing lanes and then probably would be at fault, while in the inchoative reading, W would still be stopped and would be innocent.
It seems that in most cases, such an intended future event is more than simply intentional and that W has indeed already started to act. Otherwise it would not be possible to explain the accident in (22), since there would be no reason for W 's car to have been damaged if W hadn't already started turning left.
Similarly in the case of the texts given in (23) and (24) below, the only plausible reconstruction of the accident requires vehicle "A" to have already started the action which is presented as an intention (Wanting to pass a hauler in (23) and I wanted to enter the second lane in (24) Instead of using an imperfective verbal form (i.e.étant en train de dépasser un semi-remorque ("while passing a hauler") in (23), or j'étais en train de tournerà gauche ("I was turning left") in (24)) which would clearly indicate that the action had already started, W chooses the intentional form and in doing so, creates an ambiguity for R: "Had W actually already done something or not?". This lack of precision (or downright lie?) is intentional and allows W to try to lessen his responsibility, which will succeed if R opts for a purely intentional reading of the verbal form.
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show the importance of situational, cultural and textual presuppositions from the point of view of both the writer W and the reader R. As this work constitutes a first step in the study of natural language semantics in the context of an NLP project, the approach adopted here is an attempt to automate the process of understanding these texts and deriving inferences from them. Crucial issues for NLP are how to define and describe the different types of knowledge involved in the processes of writing and reading texts, and how to establish rules that mimic the reasoning involved in these activities.
Here, we take advantage of the specificity of the texts -the authors narrate events leading to a car accident while trying to lessen their responsability -to circumscribe the type of knowledge required and to give some rules of interpretation, valid for this type of text, in this type of context. We have determined four parameters, and two types of knowledge necessary for both the production and the interpretation of these reports. Two of these parameters (A and C) and K belong to the factual domain, while the other two parameters (B and D) and LC pertain to discourse.
For clarity of exposition, we have distinguished these two types of characteristics in our texts by examining first the factual content of the texts and then their argumentative aspect, but it is not always easy to separate them and we can also ask whether there actually can be a purely factual reading of a text that would not take into account discourse and argumentation phenomena.
In any case, even if such a reading existed, it would be insufficient to account for the inferences that the reader can and must make from the textual data in order to reconstruct the events described by the text and to determine each participant's role in it. We have shown for instance that inferences based on argumentation could often help the reader clarify the text or choose between several interpretations. We find here the well-known difficulty of precisely defining the border between semantics and pragmatics.
It would be interesting to analyze the two corresponding texts by the two opponents reporting the same accident in order to establish which part of the information is objectively factual and shared by both texts, and which part of the information is argumentatively biased, thus better distinguishing the subjective part of both discourses. The omission of information, which was mentioned as one of the argumentative devices on the part of W and as a basis for inference on the part of R, would then become an even more important factor in the analysis. Very few such pairs of texts are available, but in the continuation of this project, we may try to do some further work based on these.
Lastly, we have shown that some inferences rely on assessing the relevance or the quality/quantity of the information given. This assessment itself refers to a norm which is shared by the community of speakers and thus belongs to LC. However, it remains extremely difficult to define this norm in advance and this type of inference, though crucial for language understanding, still appears beyond what is currently possible in NLP.
Annex: Texts Text 1
Me rendantà Beaumont sur Oise depuis Cergy. Je me suis retrouvéeà un carrefour juste après la sortie Beaumont sur Oise. J'étaisà un stop avec 2 voitures devant moi tournantà droite vers Mours. Alors que la première voiture passait ce stop je fis mon contrôleà gauche et je démarrais mais je percutais la deuxième voiture qui n'avait pas encore passé le stop.
Text 2
Voulant dépasser un semi-remorque qui tournaità droite, ce dernier tournà a gauche m'obligeantà braquerà gauche pour l'éviter. La voiture a dérapé sur la chaussée mouillée et a percuté un trottoir puis un mur de clôture en face. Le conducteur du camion avait bien mis son clignotantà gauche mais sa remorque inversait le signal sur la droite. Ne m'ayant pas touché le conducteur s'est déclaré hors de cause et n'a pas vouluétablir de constat. Ayant quitté ma voiture pour appeler un dépanneur j'ai retrouvé celle-ci avec la portière arrière droite enfoncée sans coordonnées du responsable.
Text 3
Fort traficà 17h15 Bd Sébastopol. Je roulais entre deux files de voitures arrêtées quand l'une des voituresà ma gauche a ouvert sa porte avant droite. Pour l'éviter, j'ai fait unécart qui m'a fait toucher le véhicule B avec l'arrière de ma moto ce qui a provoqué ma chute. Vu l'importance du traficà cette heure là nous avons justeéchangé nos assurances et noms ce qui explique que mon constat amiable ne soit signé que par moi.
Text 4
Véhicule B venant de ma gauche, je me trouve dans le carrefour,à faible vitesse environ 40 km/h, quand le véhicule B, percute mon véhicule, et me refuse la prioritéà droite. Le premier choc atteint mon aile arrière gauche, sous le choc, età cause de la chaussée glissante, mon véhicule dérape, et percute la protection métallique d'un arbre, d'où un second choc frontal.
